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Meduza Stealer Malware: What Is It & How Does It Work?

Blog Author
Uptycs Threat Research

Recently, while monitoring dark web forums and Telegram channels, the Uptycs Threat Research team made a compelling discovery: a formidable menace dubbed The Meduza Stealer. 

 

Crafted by an enigmatic actor known as 'Meduza', this malware has been specifically designed to target Windows users and organizations, currently sparing only ten specific countries from its reach. 

 

The Meduza Stealer malware has a singular objective: comprehensive data theft. It pilfers users' browsing activities, extracting a wide array of browser-related data. From critical login credentials to the valuable record of browsing history and meticulously curated bookmarks, no digital artifact is safe. Even crypto wallet extensions, password managers, and 2FA extensions are vulnerable.

Left unchecked, the consequences for those affected could be severe, including financial losses and the potential for large-scale data breaches that can have far-reaching implications for organizations.

 

While Meduza may be a recent addition to the realm of cybercrime and no specific attacks have been attributed to date, the risks it poses shouldn't be underestimated.

To proactively address this emerging threat, Uptycs has taken action by incorporating a YARA rule into our product. This integration empowers us to conduct thorough memory scanning, enabling swift detection and effective mitigation of the Meduza threat.

 

What sets Meduza apart is its evolving nature. Our conversations with the malware's administrator highlight that it is not simply another run-of-the-mill ransomware, but an actively developed tool, poised for the potential addition of new features. The malware admin did explicitly state that their operations do not involve any ransom activities and that their sole focus is on functioning as a stealer. Currently, Meduza can avoid detection in certain countries and prevent execution if the attacker's server is unreachable, making it an extremely stealth cybersecurity threat. 

 

The Uptycs threat research team’s analysis of the Meduza stealer reveals its distribution methods, capabilities, potential impact, and highlights their concerted efforts to counter this threat.

 

Marketing & Distribution Tactics of Meduza Stealer

 

The administrator of the Meduza stealer has been employing sophisticated marketing strategies to promote this malicious offering. In a calculated move to gain trust and confidence, they have initiated static and dynamic scans of the Meduza stealer file using some of the industry's most reputable antivirus software. Screenshots were then shared demonstrating that this potent malware could evade detection by these top-tier antivirus solutions.

What makes Meduza stealer particularly crafty is its operational design. This binary does not employ obfuscation techniques, a common practice among similar threats, making it harder to identify and trace. Additionally, it seeks to establish a connection with the attacker's server before it commences the theft of data from victim machines. If this connection fails, it terminates promptly, further complicating attempts to trace its activities.

The marketing efforts didn't stop at proving the malware's efficacy. As shown in Figure 1, the administrator has been advertising the Meduza stealer aggressively via cybercrime forums and Telegram channels.

 

Figure 1: Advertising via cybercrime forum and Telegram

Fig.1 – Advertising via cyber-crime forum and Telegram

 

What's more concerning is that a large portion of antivirus software has proven ineffective against the Meduza stealer binary, either failing to detect it statically or dynamically. (Fig. 2, Fig. 3).

 

Figure 2: Static AV scan report

Fig.2 – Static AV scan report

 

Figure 3: Dynamic AV scan report

Fig.3 – Dynamic AV scan report

 

But the real game-changer in their marketing strategy has been the pricing model and the added control provided to subscribers. To attract potential customers, the administrator offers access to the stolen data through a user-friendly web panel (Fig.4). They present different subscription options, including a one-month, three-month, and lifetime access plan, each with its own price point.

Inside this web panel, subscribers can craft their customized binary options. The panel offers a wealth of information, including IP addresses, geographical data, OS build names, and even the count of stored passwords, wallets, and cookies. This feature allows subscribers to download or delete the stolen data directly from the web page, granting them an unprecedented level of control over their ill-gotten information. This in-depth feature set showcases the sophisticated nature of the Meduza stealer and the lengths its creators are willing to go to ensure its success.

 

Figure 4: Web panel

Fig.4 – Web panel

 

Meduza Stealer's Workflow

 

The Meduza Stealer initiates its operations once it successfully infiltrates a machine. The first step it performs is a geolocation check. If the victim's location is in the stealer's predefined list of excluded countries, the malware operation is immediately aborted.

 

However, if the location isn't on the list, Meduza Stealer checks if the attacker's server is active. In case the server isn't accessible, the stealer also promptly terminates its activity. If both conditions—location check and server accessibility—are favorable, the stealer proceeds to gather extensive information. This includes collecting system information, browser data, password manager details, mining-related registry information, and details about installed games.

 

Once this comprehensive set of data is gathered, it is packaged and uploaded, ready to be dispatched to the attacker's server, thereby completing the stealer's operation within the infected machine. See Figure 5.

 

Figure 5: Meduza work flow

Fig.5 – Work flow

 

Additionally, it's important to highlight the variety of data that the malware collects - system info, browser info, password manager info, miner related registry info, and installed games info. This demonstrates the broad potential impact of an infection, as it targets not only personal and financial data, but also system-specific and potentially proprietary information. Lastly, the swift uploading and transferring of the collected data to the attacker's server accentuates the speed at which a breach can occur and the urgent need for effective detection and protection measures.

 

Utilizing APIs and country exclusions: How Meduza stealer operates

 

This section delves into the operational mechanisms of Meduza Stealer, highlighting its utilization of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and the implementation of a country exclusion feature. The unraveling of these technical aspects provides a clearer understanding of how this malware functions, assisting users and cybersecurity professionals in anticipating its tactics and developing more effective countermeasures. The exploration covers everything from the initial infection phase to how Meduza communicates with its Command and Control server, demonstrating the malware's sophistication and wide-reaching capabilities.

First, the stealer leverages the GetUserGeoID and GetGeoInfoA APIs on the victim's machine to obtain country details, which are subsequently compared to a predefined list. See Figure 6.

 

Figure 6: Listed countriesFig.6 – Listed countries

 

Exclusion List

The table below outlines the country codes and corresponding names from the exclusion list.

 

Country name

Country code

Russia

RU

Kazakhstan

KZ

Belarus

BY

Georgia

GE

Turkmenistan

TM

Uzbekistan

UZ

Armenia

AM

Kyrgyzstan

KG

Moldova

MD

Tajikistan

TJ

 

If the victim's country isn't part of this list, the malware tries to establish a connection with the attacker's server (Fig.7). If the connection fails, the process comes to a halt. A likely reason for this particular list of excluded countries is that countries often avoid launching cyberattacks against their own or friendly nations, although the specific rationale behind this restraint may not be explicitly stated.

 

Figure 7: Connect threat actor server

Fig.7 – Connect threat actor server

 

Upon activation, the malware begins to collect system information from the victim's machine, using a variety of Windows APIs such as GetUserName, GetComputerName, GetCurrentHWProfile, and EnumDisplayDevices. It also retrieves the public IP address using the HTTPS-based API found at https[:]//api.ipify[.]org. A screenshot of the current Windows screen is taken and converted into base64 format.

System details collected

  • System build details
  • Computer name
  • CPU details
  • Execute path
  • Geo 
  • GPU 
  • Hardware ID details
  • Public Ip
  • OS details
  • RAM details
  • Screen Resolution details
  • Screenshot
  • Time
  • TimeZone
  • Username

Figure 8: Victim Details

Fig.8 – Victim details

 

The stealer possesses a predefined list of browsers and proceeds to enumerate the "User Data" folder, where it reads various browser-related data such as Browser History, Cookies, Login Data, Web Data, Login Data for Account, and Local State.

 

Listed browsers

Google\Chrome
Google\Chrome Beta
Google(x86)\Chrome
Google\Chrome SxS
360ChromeX\Chrome
Chromium
Microsoft\Edge
BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser
Epic Privacy Browser
Amigo
Vivaldi
Kometa
Orbitum
Mail.Ru\Atom
Comodo\Dragon
Torch
Comodo
Slimjet
360Browser\Browser
360se6
Baidu Spark
Falkon\profiles
AVAST Software\Browser
Waterfox
URBrowser
Comodo\IceDragon
CryptoTab Browser
Moonchild Productions\Pale Moon
Superbird
BitTube\BitTubeBrowser
NetboxBrowser
InsomniacBrowser
Maxthon3\Users

Maxthon5\Users\guest\MagicFill
Maxthon\Application
Tencent\QQBrowser
K-Meleon
Xpom
Lenovo\SLBrowser
Xvast
Go!
Safer Technologies\Secure Browser
Sputnik\Sputnik
Nichrome
CocCoc\Browser
uCozMedia\Uran
Chromodo
YandexBrowser
7Star
Chedot
CentBrowser
Iridium
Naver\Naver Whale
Titan Browser
Mozilla\SeaMonkey
UCBrowser
CLIQZ
Flock
NETGATE Technologies\BlackHawk
Sidekick
Moonchild Productions\Basilisk
GhostBrowser
GarenaPlus
Viasat Browser

Opera Software\Opera Stable
Opera Software\Opera Neon
Opera Software\Opera Crypto Developer
Opera Software\Opera GX Stable
Elements Browser
CatalinaGroup\Citrio
Fenrir Inc\Sleipnir5\setting\modules\ChromiumViewer
QIP Surf
Liebao
Coowon\Coowon
MapleStudio\ChromePlus
Rafotech\Mustang
Suhba
TorBro\Profile
RockMelt
Bromium
Twinkstar
CCleaner Browser
AcWebBrowserr
CoolNovo
SRWare Iron
Mozilla\Firefox
AVG\Browser
Thunderbird
Blisk
8pecxstudios\Cyberfonx
SwingBrowser
Mozilla\IceCat
SalamWeb
FlashPeak\SlimBrowser
Kinza

In addition, the stealer scans the Telegram Desktop application by checking the Windows registry, specifically the ID found in the following paths: 

  • HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\{53F49750-6209-4FBF-9CA8-7A333C87D1ED}_is1
  • HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\{C4A4AE8F-B9F7-4CC7-8A6C-BF7EEE87ACA5}_is1

The registry paths mentioned above contain crucial details such as display names, versions, UninstallString, and other pertinent data.

Additional Clients Targeted

  • Steam client
  • Discord
  • Password manager applications
  • Two-factor authentication (2FA)
  • Cryptocurrency wallet extensions

The stealer extracts ID details of password manager applications, 2FA, and cryptocurrency wallet extensions. These are of particular interest as they can contain valuable information and may have vulnerabilities that the attacker can exploit to gain unauthorized access to user accounts.

 

Steam client

The stealer retrieves Steam client data by reading the registry key "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Valve\Steam.” Steam is a digital distribution platform created by Valve Corporation, primarily used for video games. This registry key stores user-specific settings, game information, login data, session information, and other configuration data associated with the Steam client.

 

Discord

The stealer accesses the Discord folder and retrieves the configuration and other relevant details, such as:

 

  • Discord
  • DiscordCanary
  • DiscordPTB
  • Lightcord
  • DiscordDevelopment

Extension ID

The malware attempts to extract the ID details of password manager applications, two-factor authentication (2FA) and cryptocurrency wallet extensions from web browsers.

 

Furthermore, the malware specifically focuses on extracting data from extensions related to 2FA and password managers. These extensions can store crucial information and may have vulnerabilities. By obtaining access to 2FA codes or exploiting weaknesses in password manager extensions, attackers can bypass security measures and gain unauthorized entry to user accounts.

 

Extension IDs of password managers and 2FA:

 

Password Managers and Authentication Name Extension ID
Authenticator 2FA
Authenticator 2FA
Trezor Password Manager
GAuth Authenticator
EOS Authenticator
1Password
1Password
KeePassXC
KeePassXC
Dashlane Password Manager
Dashlane Password Manager
Bitwarden Password Manager
Bitwarden Password Manager
NordPass
Keeper Password Manager
RoboForm
RoboForm
LastPass
LastPass
BrowserPass
MYKI
MYKI
Splikity
CommonKey
SSO Authenticator
Zoho Vault
Authy

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ocglkepbibnalbgmbachknglpdipeoio
imloifkgjagghnncjkhggdhalmcnfklk
ilgcnhelpchnceeipipijaljkblbcobl
oeljdldpnmdbchonielidgobddffflal
aeblfdkhhhdcdjpifhhbdiojplfjncoa
dppgmdbiimibapkepcbdbmkaabgiofem
oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk
pdffhmdngciaglkoonimfcmckehcpafo
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gehmmocbbkpblljhkekmfhjpfbkclbph
nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb
jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh
fooolghllnmhmmndgjiamiiodkpenpbb
bfogiafebfohielmmehodmfbbebbbpei
pnlccmojcmeohlpggmfnbbiapkmbliob
ljfpcifpgbbchoddpjefaipoiigpdmag
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nofkfblpeailgignhkbnapbephdnmbmn
jhfjfclepacoldmjmkmdlmganfaalklb
chgfefjpcobfbnpmiokfjjaglahmnded
nhhldecdfagpbfggphklkaeiocfnaafm
igkpcodhieompeloncfnbekccinhapdb
gaedmjdfmmahhbjefcbgaolhhanlaolb

Crypto wallet extensions
The malware attempts to extract cryptocurrency wallet extensions from web browsers via software plugins or add-ons that enable users to conveniently manage their cryptocurrency assets directly within web browsers like Chrome or Firefox. These extensions provide functionality for tasks such as monitoring account balances, conducting cryptocurrency transactions details.

The following table shows Extension IDs of crypto wallets:

 

Cryptocurrency wallet Name Extension ID
MetaMask
MetaMask
MetaMask
Binance Wallet
BitApp Wallet
Coin98 Wallet
SafePal Wallet
SafePal Wallet
DAppPlay
Guarda
EQUA Wallet
GuildWallet
Casper Wallet
Unknown wallet
ICONex
Math Wallet
Math Wallet
MOBOX WALLET
Phantom
TronLink
XDCPay
Ton
Sollet
Slope
DuinoCoin Wallet
Starcoin
Hiro Wallet
MetaWallet
Swash
Finnie
Keplr
Crocobit Wallet
Oxygen
Nifty Wallet
Liquality
Ronin Wallet
Ronin Wallet
Oasis
Temple
Pontem Aptos Wallet
Solflare Wallet
Yoroi
iWallet
Wombat – Gaming Wallet for Ethereum & EOS
Coinbase Wallet
MEW CX
Jaxx Liberty
OneKey
Hycon Lite Client
SubWallet or Polkadot
Goby
TezBox
ONTO Wallet
Hashpack
Cyano
Martian Wallet for Sui & Aptos
Sender Wallet
Zecrey
Auro
Terra Station
KardiaChain
Rabby Wallet
NeoLine
Nabox
XDEFI
KHC
OneKey
CLW
Polymesh
ZilPay
Byone
Eternl
Unknown wallet
Nami
Maiar DeFi Wallet
LeafWallet
Brave Wallet
Opera Wallet
CWallet
Flint Wallet
Exodus Web3 Wallet
Trust Wallet
Crypto Airdrops & Bounties

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ejbalbakoplchlghecdalmeeeajnimhm
djclckkglechooblngghdinmeemkbgci
fhbohimaelbohpjbbldcngcnapndodjp
fihkakfobkmkjojpchpfgcmhfjnmnfpi
aeachknmefphepccionboohckonoeemg
lgmpcpglpngdoalbgeoldeajfclnhafa
apenkfbbpmhihehmihndmmcdanacolnh
lodccjjbdhfakaekdiahmedfbieldgik
hpglfhgfnhbgpjdenjgmdgoeiappafln
blnieiiffboillknjnepogjhkgnoapac
nanjmdknhkinifnkgdcggcfnhdaammmj
abkahkcbhngaebpcgfmhkoioedceoigp
dfmbcapkkeejcpmfhpnglndfkgmalhik
flpiciilemghbmfalicajoolhkkenfel
afbcbjpbpfadlkmhmclhkeeodmamcflc
dfeccadlilpndjjohbjdblepmjeahlmm
fcckkdbjnoikooededlapcalpionmalo
bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa
ibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklmnkoeoihofec
bocpokimicclpaiekenaeelehdjllofo
nphplpgoakhhjchkkhmiggakijnkhfnd
fhmfendgdocmcbmfikdcogofphimnkno
pocmplpaccanhmnllbbkpgfliimjljgo
ippiokklhjjdlmmonmjimgbgnnllcleg
mfhbebgoclkghebffdldpobeajmbecfk
ldinpeekobnhjjdofggfgjlcehhmanlj
bkklifkecemccedpkhcebagjpehhabfb
cmndjbecilbocjfkibfbifhngkdmjgog
cjmkndjhnagcfbpiemnkdpomccnjblmj
dmkamcknogkgcdfhhbddcghachkejeap
pnlfjmlcjdjgkddecgincndfgegkecke
fhilaheimglignddkjgofkcbgekhenbh
jbdaocneiiinmjbjlgalhcelgbejmnid
kpfopkelmapcoipemfendmdcghnegimn
fnjhmkhhmkbjkkabndcnnogagogbneec
kjmoohlgokccodicjjfebfomlbljgfhk
ppdadbejkmjnefldpcdjhnkpbjkikoip
ookjlbkiijinhpmnjffcofjonbfbgaoc
phkbamefinggmakgklpkljjmgibohnba
bhhhlbepdkbapadjdnnojkbgioiodbic
ffnbelfdoeiohenkjibnmadjiehjhajb
kncchdigobghenbbaddojjnnaogfppfj
amkmjjmmflddogmhpjloimipbofnfjih
hnfanknocfeofbddgcijnmhnfnkdnaad
nlbmnnijcnlegkjjpcfjclmcfggfefdm
cjelfplplebdjjenllpjcblmjkfcffne
jnmbobjmhlngoefaiojfljckilhhlhcj
bcopgchhojmggmffilplmbdicgaihlkp
onhogfjeacnfoofkfgppdlbmlmnplgbn
jnkelfanjkeadonecabehalmbgpfodjm
mnfifefkajgofkcjkemidiaecocnkjeh
ifckdpamphokdglkkdomedpdegcjhjdp
gjagmgiddbbciopjhllkdnddhcglnemk
dkdedlpgdmmkkfjabffeganieamfklkm
efbglgofoippbgcjepnhiblaibcnclgk
epapihdplajcdnnkdeiahlgigofloibg
ojbpcbinjmochkhelkflddfnmcceomdi
cnmamaachppnkjgnildpdmkaakejnhae
aiifbnbfobpmeekipheeijimdpnlpgpp
pdadjkfkgcafgbceimcpbkalnfnepbnk
acmacodkjbdgmoleebolmdjonilkdbch
cphhlgmgameodnhkjdmkpanlelnlohao
nknhiehlklippafakaeklbeglecifhad
hmeobnfnfcmdkdcmlblgagmfpfboieaf
hcflpincpppdclinealmandijcmnkbgn
jnmbobjmhlngoefaiojfljckilhhlhcj
nhnkbkgjikgcigadomkphalanndcapjk
jojhfeoedkpkglbfimdfabpdfjaoolaf
klnaejjgbibmhlephnhpmaofohgkpgkd
nlgbhdfgdhgbiamfdfmbikcdghidoadd
kmhcihpebfmpgmihbkipmjlmmioameka
acdamagkdfmpkclpoglgnbddngblgibo
lpfcbjknijpeeillifnkikgncikgfhdo
dngmlblcodfobpdpecaadgfbcggfjfnm
cihmoadaighcejopammfbmddcmdekcje
odbfpeeihdkbihmopkbjmoonfanlbfcl
gojhcdgcpbpfigcaejpfhfegekdgiblk
apnehcjmnengpnmccpaibjmhhoadaico
hnhobjmcibchnmglfbldbfabcgaknlkj
aholpfdialjgjfhomihkjbmgjidlcdno
egjidjbpglichdcondbcbdnbeeppgdph
dhgnlgphgchebgoemcjekedjjbifijid

The stealer reads the configuration and related data stored within the following registry.

  • HKCU\SOFTWARE\Etherdyne\Etherwall\geth
  • HKCU\SOFTWARE\monero-project\monero-core
  • HKCU\SOFTWARE\DogecoinCore\DogecoinCore-Qt
  • HKCU\SOFTWARE\BitcoinCore\BitcoinCore-Qt
  • HKCU\SOFTWARE\LitecoinCore\LitecoinCore-Qt
  • HKCU\SOFTWARE\DashCore\DashCore-Qt


After gathering stolen data, it attempts to establish a connection with a socket and utilizes a send handle to transmit the data to the attacker's server.

Prevention and detection

The importance of timely detection and proactive prevention of threats such as the Meduza Stealer is crucial. Here at Uptycs, our aim is to equip you with the knowledge and resources needed to keep your systems secure and resilient against evolving cyber threats.

 

Defensive measures

To defend against malware attacks like the Meduza Stealer, it is recommended to:

  • Regularly install updates for your operating system, browsers, and installed applications to patch vulnerabilities that malware can exploit.
  • Be cautious when downloading files or opening email attachments, especially from unknown sources. Scan files using security software before opening them.
  • Employ strong and unique passwords for all your accounts, including browsers, email, and cryptocurrency wallets. Consider using a password manager to securely store and manage your passwords.
  • Enable 2FA wherever possible to add an extra layer of security to your accounts. This helps protect against unauthorized access, even if passwords are compromised.
  • Only install browser extensions from trusted sources. Regularly review and remove unnecessary or suspicious extensions to minimize the risk of malware interference.
  • Keep a close eye on your financial accounts, including cryptocurrency wallets, and regularly review transaction history for any suspicious activities. Report any unauthorized transactions or security breaches immediately.

 Uptycs XDR Detection

Uptycs extended detection and response (XDR) customers can easily scan for Meduza Stealer since Uptycs XDR is armed with YARA process scanning and advanced detections. Additionally, Uptycs XDR contextual detection provides important details about the identified malware.Users can navigate to the toolkit data section in a detection alert, then click the name of a detected item to reveal its profile. (Fig. 9).

 

Figure 9: Uptycs XDR detection

Fig.9 – Uptycs XDR detection

 

Meduza YARA detection rule

Uptycs XDR scans the memory of newly launched processes and detects any presence of suspicious strings by utilizing YARA rules. The YARA rule for detecting this malware has already been made available to our customers.

 

rule Uptycs_Meduza

{

    meta:

    malware_name = "Meduza"

    description = "Meduza is a trojan stealer that gathers sensitive data such as browser cookies, histories, crypto wallet information, and more from infected machines."

    author = "Uptycs Inc"

    version = "1"

 

    strings:

   

$string_1 = "autofill-profiles.json"  ascii wide

    $string_2 = "formhistory.sqlite"  ascii wide

    $string_3 = "logins.json"  ascii wide

    $string_4 = "cookies.sqlite"  ascii wide

    $string_5 = "key4.db"  ascii wide

    $string_6 = "Electrum\\config"  ascii wide

    $string_7 = "Sparrow\\wallets"  ascii wide

    $string_8 = "Coinomi\\wallets"  ascii wide

    $string_9 = "Electrum-LTC\\wallets"  ascii wide

    $string_10 = "Mozilla\\SeaMonkey"  ascii wide

    $string_11 = "Yandex\\YandexBrowser"  ascii wide

    $string_12 = "BrowserPass"  ascii wide

 

    condition:

    all of them

}

 

IOC

File name MD5
Stealer
Stealer
45f0b444f8de5bf28ffc312212935284
8058b771b506f0ac785b55e6e16e012e

URL

By analyzing the VirusTotal graph, we were able to identify Meduza stealer samples spreading in recent days. According to a VirusTotal analysis report, the Meduza Stealer malware components are seen to be communicating with a server located in Germany (Fig. 10).

 

Figure 10: VirusTotal graph

Fig.10 – Virustotal graph